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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the vulnerability of fiscal policy in the case of 10 Central and 
Eastern European countries. We use a newly introduce indicator named Cumulative Excess of the 
Primary Balance (CEPB) which shows the deviations of current fiscal policy from a fiscal rule implying 
the stabilization of the public debt. Using annual data extracted for 1996-2010 period, we find no 
evidence of fiscal vulnerability in the case of Bulgaria and Estonia. For rest of the countries the results 
indicate more or less fiscal vulnerability depending how large CEPB is. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large body of research bringing into attention multiple difficulties that fiscal policy of the 
advanced economies has confronted for many decades: growing social spending, large budgetary 
deficits, increasing public debt, ageing population. But, what is the situation for Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries that recently joined the European Union (EU)? For the last twenty years, 
they have faced growing challenges in their ongoing economic development: the transition from the 
state-owned economy to the market economy; the efforts of catching up the gap from the advanced 
EU economies; the process of joining the European Union; the challenge of achieving the constraints 
imposed by Maastricht Treaty (MT). Hence, government’s interventions were strongly needed also 
                                                 
 Acknowledgments: This work was cofinaced from the European Social Fund through Sectoral Operational 
Programme  Human  Resources  Development  2007-2013,  project  number  POSDRU/89/1.5/S/59184 
„Performance and excellence in postdoctoral research in Romanian economic science domain”. 
Much of this work was completed during my research visit in September-October 2011 at the Department of 
Applied Economics (DULBEA) in Université Libre de Bruxelles under the supervision of Professor Ali Bayar.  
The author also wishes to thank David Duffy (University of Portsmouth) for helpful discussions. 
 69 
 
requiring large spending. The data show that even if the government expenditure was below the 
average size recorded for the advanced economies, the increase rate was higher in the case of CEE
1. 
There are also previous studies revealing some particularities of CEE fiscal policy.  In that sense, 
Cuaresma, Eller and Mehrotra (2011) found that fiscal stance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia is affected by the fiscal policy changes in Germany, and, if German government 
undertakes a fiscal expansion, than all the five countries  will by fiscal easing, more on the public 
spending than on the revenue side. Concerned on keeping a low taxation rate to stimulate economic 
growth and investments, on one hand, and concerned on satisfying the growing needs due to the 
structural changes by public investments, CEE governments might have run a too expansionary fiscal 
policy that led to large fiscal imbalances and accumulation of public debt.  
Afonso, Nickel and Rother (2005)  also  pointed out that public debt -to-GDP ratio in Central and 
Eastern  European  countries  was  below  the  indebtedness  ratio  for  the  advanced  European 
economies, but, in exchange, the increasing rate of public debt was much higher. Hence, the authors 
argued that fiscal consolidation is strongly needed.  Moreover,  Mihaljek (2009) showed that CEE 
countries  financed their long expansion to a great extent by foreign borrowing , and, given the 
scarcity of external sources of funding in the latest years, private consumption and investment in the 
region will have to adjust. In addition, according to Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2006) if there is a wrong 
balance between internal and external borrowings, this could lead to a sharply increase in the cost of 
capital, hence exposing economy to a debt crisis.  
Governments’ fiscal response to various shocks has a great importance in order to absorb them and 
to avoid transforming them into systemic risk. Thus, a flexible and healthy fiscal policy which reacts 
immediately and as expected represents a comparative advantage. Concerning the CEE countries, 
Stoian  and  Câmpeanu  (2010)  found  that  for  the  cases  of  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
Hungary, and Lithuania, governments have the ability to run a primary surplus – in the short term - 
when  a  shock  on  public  debt  occurs.  On  contrary,  in  the  case  of  Latvia,  Poland,  Romania,  and 
Slovakia, governments’ response is opposite as expected: they have the tendency to lower surpluses 
when public debt increases. 
Previous literature suggests that fiscal policy of Central and Eastern European had to face various 
challenges during these decades. Therefore, we aim in examining whether these difficulties made 
fiscal policy more vulnerable in the sense of having a solvency risk exposure
2. This paper focuses on 
ten Central and Eastern European countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, in the following referred to as CEE -10
3. 
We investigate fiscal vulnerability  using the methodology newly introduced by Stoian (2011a, b) 
which allows indicating the deviations of current fiscal policy from a fiscal rule implying the 
stabilization of the public debt. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the 
methodology used for assessing fiscal vulnerability in CEE-10. Section 3 presents a general overview 
of some key fiscal variables which could affect public debt dynamic , hence increasing the solvency 
                                                 
1 We computed annual averages and the average of the increase rate of government total expenditures to-GDP 
ratio for CEE and for EU15 using annual data extracted for 1996-2010 and available from Ameco.  
2 We refer to fiscal solvency risk exposure considering government’s ability for meeting the intertemporal 
budget constraint. 
3 We use the following acronyms: Bulgaria-BG; the Czech Republic-CZ; Estonia-EE; Latvia-LV; Lithuania-LT; 
Hungary-HU; Poland-PL; Romania-RO; Slovenia-SI; Slovakia-SK. 70 
 
risk exposure. Section 4 comprises of the empirical results and further discussions. Section 5 gives 
the concluding remarks of the study. 
 
2. Methodology 
Reviewing the existing literature investigating fiscal vulnerability we found only few papers providing 
a comprehensive or explicit definition of this concept or related (Hemming and Petrie, 2000; Brixi, 
Shatalov and Zlaoui, 2000; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig, 
2003; Rial and Vicente, 2004; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010; Greene, 2011; Hayes, 2011). But all the 
debates converge to a general accepted view which suggests that fiscal policy is vulnerable whenever 
there is an increased probability that governments fail in achieving intertemporal budget constraint 
(IBC). At this point, one might legitimately ask which the distinction between fiscal vulnerability and 
fiscal sustainability is considering that both concepts rely on the solvency criteria. We may argue that 
fiscal sustainability considers the fulfillment of IBC on the long run whilst fiscal vulnerability indicates 
how IBC is affected on short term due to some changes of the key fiscal indicators. Hence, the 
understanding of fiscal vulnerability gives also useful insights about the factors that could endanger 
fiscal sustainability.   
Concerning the methodology of studying the vulnerability of fiscal policy, we also found only few 
approaches.  For  instance,  Hemming  and  Petrie  (2000)  and  Hemming,  Kell  and  Schimmelpfennig 
(2003) provided a list of factors and various aspects affecting fiscal policy hat should be considered 
when analyzing fiscal vulnerability. Rial and Vicente (2004) examined fiscal vulnerability for the case 
of  Uruguay  using  sensitivity  analysis of  public  debt  to  changes  in  the  key  variables  affecting  its 
dynamic: GDP growth rate, interest rate and real devaluation. Baldacci, McHugh and Petrova (2011) 
and  Baldacci,  Petrova, Belhocine, Dobrescu  and  Mazraani  (2011)  developed  a  fiscal  vulnerability 
index indicating the deviations of key fiscal variables from their historical norm defined as 10 years 
cross country averages.  
Stoian (2011a,b) also introduced a new method of studying fiscal vulnerability which bases on the 
assumption that  governments aims in stabilizing public debt when confronting large indebtedness 
ratios  or  increasing  indebtedness  rate.  Basically,  we  can  check  whether  government  is  able  to 
generate sufficient revenues to finance the primary expenditures without increasing public debt. 
Thus, this method firstly uses a public debt dynamic equation that estimates the primary balance 
which stabilizes public debt.  At time t, government has to borrow money (Bt) to finance the primary 
deficit (the difference between primary expenditures, Gt, and government revenues, Vt), interest 
payment related to previous year (i·Bt-1) and public debt from previous year (Bt-1): 
1 1        t t t t t B i B R G B                   (1) 
where i is the nominal interest rate. 
Rearranging equation (1), a different form is obtained: 
1 1        t t t t t B i R G B B                   (2) 
Considering the variables as ratios to GDP (small caps denote that) and using GDP deflator (Pt) and 
real GDP (Yt), equation (1) becomes: 71 
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where pt=primary balance-to-GDP ratio, at time t. 
If we assume that government aims at stabilizing public debt, then it will ensure that public debt-to-
GDP ratio remains unchanged ( 1   t t b b ). In this context, equation (4) becomes: 
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Rearranging terms in equation (5), it becomes: 
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Considering small variations of  g    equation (6) can be re-written as: 
1
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Equation (7) gives the required primary balance that stabilizes public debt. It can be viewed as a fiscal 
rule
4 that sets the financing requirements for the government considering the rate of growth, the 
price movement, the implicit rate on public debt and the public debt from previous year. As a matter 
of fact,  Clayes  (2008)  found that a combination of procedural  and numerical rules that was 
introduced in Sweden to response to 1991 fiscal crisis proved to be effective and, consequently, the 
public debt went down. 
Comparing the stabilizing primary balance (
*
t p ) with the current one (pt), we can state that fiscal 
policy is ‘good’ and non-vulnerable whenever 
*
t p  = pt , or 
*
t p  < pt. If governments aim at keeping the 
increasing rate of public debt down to zero then it should achieve the stabilizing primary balance. 
Taking into consideration that we use time series of macroeconomic data which is subject to business 
cycle, we can apply the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to remove its influence 
By definition, we can decompose the primary balance (pt) into a structural ( ) and a cyclical (  
component as shown in (8): 
                                                 
4 We refer here only on the numerical fiscal rule that impose a certain size for a headline fiscal indicator (e.g. 
the budgetary deficit, public debt, structural deficit, primary balance). The numerical fiscal rule can be imposed 
by national governments, or by supranational organization (e.g. European Commission). The size of the fiscal 
rule can be derived from economic models. A comprehensive disscussion on fiscal rules is provided by Wyplosz 
(2012). 72 
 
                     (8) 
where α is the elasticity of the primary balance with respect to output ( ). 
By subtracting the cyclical component ( ) from the primary balance (pt) we obtain the structural 
component of the primary balance which is independent of the business cycle and gives the measure 
of the discretionary fiscal policy: 
                     (9) 
The simplest method for this decomposition is the one proposed by Hodrick and Prescott in their 
original work of 1981
5. According to their study, a time series  xt  is given by a growth component gt 
and a cycle component ct.  
                 (10) 
The smoothness of the growth component of the time series is given by the sum of the squares of its 
second  difference.  Hodrick  and  Prescott  (1981)  argued  that  the  average  deviations  of  the  cycle 
component from the growth component over the long time periods are nearly zero. The growth 
component is given by the solution of the following optimization problem: 
      (11) 
We extract the cycle component from the stabilizing and the current primary balance. Then, applying 
equation (9) we calculate the structural component of the balance. The resulting components are 
named the adjusted stabilizing primary balance (
* ˆt p ), and, respectively, the adjusted current primary 
balance ( ). 
Following Blanchard (1990) who suggested primary gap for the study of fiscal sustainability, we can 
measure the deviations of the current fiscal policy from the fiscal rule by calculating the difference 
between the adjusted stabilizing primary balance (  
   ) and the adjusted current primary balance (    ). 
The gap represents The Excess of the Primary Balance (EPB): 
         
                               (12) 
Depending on the sign of EPB, different situations may occur: 
I.  The adjusted stabilizing primary balance (  
   ) and the adjusted current primary balance      are 
both positive (which means surplus) 
a.  If,   
   ≤    , then   
   -    ≤0, implying a ‘good’ fiscal policy; 
b.  If,   
          , then   
   -    >0, implying a ‘vulnerable’ fiscal policy. 
                                                 
5  There  is  a  large  debate  on  the  methodology  used  to  extract  the  cycal  component  and  to  calculate  the 
structural  balance.  The  main  difficulty  is  to  estimate  the  potential  output.  In  that  sense,    International 
Monetary Fund uses an equlibrium model for Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, Organisation 
For  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  estimate  potential  output  base  on  Cobb-Douglas  production 
function while European Commission  applies Hodrick-Prescott filter (for further discussions see, for instance, 
Brandner, Diebalek şi Schuberth, 1998) . We choose to use HP given its simplicity and the possibility to apply, 
analogous, both on the actual and stabilizing primary balance. 73 
 
II.  The stabilizing primary balance (  
   ) and the current primary balance (    ) are both negative 
(which means deficit) 
a.  If,   
   ≤    , then   
   -    ≤0, implying a ‘good’ fiscal policy; 
b.  If,   
          , then   
   -    >0, implying a ‘vulnerable’ fiscal policy. 
III.  The stabilizing primary balance (  
   ) is on surplus (+) and the current primary balance (    ) is 
on deficit (-), then   
   -    >0, implying a ‘vulnerable’ fiscal policy. 
IV.  The  stabilizing  primary  balance  (  
 )  =  deficit  (+)  and  the  current  primary  balance  (    )  = 
surplus (+), then   
   -    <0, implying a ‘good’ fiscal policy. 
Whenever government achieves exactly or exceeds the fiscal rule, then we state that fiscal policy is a 
‘good’. Thus, we assume that the financing requirements are met and the intertemporal budget 
constraint can be fulfilled in the long run implying no exposure to the solvency risk. If government 
fulfills the fiscal rule for many consecutive years, then fiscal position might consolidate and fiscal 
policy is said to be non-vulnerable. Contrary, when government does not achieve the stabilizing 
primary balance, and postpones the adjustment actions, fiscal position is deteriorating. Hence, the 
budgetary deficit becomes larger and the public debt-to-GDP ratio is increasing. In this situation, 
fiscal policy is more exposed to solvency risk, and is said to be ‘vulnerable’. 
To avoid the occasional deviations from the fiscal rule we use the event studies approach for the 
capital markets introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). The Cumulative Excess of the 
Primary Balance (CEPB) is calculated by summing up all the gaps in order to capture the effects of the 
drifting fiscal policy from the fiscal rule in the long run.  
                  (13) 
where N is the number of observations 
We  consider  that  fiscal  policy  is  non-vulnerable  when  CEPB  has  negative  values.  When  CEPB  is 
positive and increasing, we argue that fiscal policy is vulnerable implying that government cannot 
meet anymore the financing requirements imposed by the fiscal rule, and, therefore, fiscal policy is 
much exposed to solvency risk. If government decides to adjust fiscal policy and to restore it to the 
fiscal rule, then CEPB will start decreasing. 
 
3. General Overview of Key Fiscal Variables for CEE-10 
Stoian (2011b) pointed out that many of EU advanced economies have confronted difficulties since 
the early ’70, determined by the increasing public debt starting in the early ‘70s and late ‘80s. The 
author also found that larger indebtedness ratios were much higher after imposing the Maastricht 
Treaty than before and that the economic growth rate was below the interest rate on public debt. 
These  represent  some  key  variables  that  could  affect  public  debt  dynamic  and,  hence,  the 
intertemporal budget constrained.   74 
 
Analyzing the same variables for CEE-10 using annual data from 1996 to 2010, we found a significant 
different context. Figure 1 shows that the real growth rate for each Central and Eastern European 
country considered for investigation was higher than the average growth rate for EU-15. This may be 
explained considering the catching up process for reducing the existing development gap. Therefore, 
governments pushed up the demand side to reach economic growth. But, there are cases where this 
strategy led to ‘overheating’ economy, as Zaidi and Rejniak (2010) noticed for the Baltic countries.  
Figure 1   Real growth rate for EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: real growth rate annual average calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 provided by AMECO 
With respect to budgetary deficits, most of CEE-10 recorded on average higher levels than EU-15 did 
for the same peiod, except the cases of Bulgaria and Estonia (see Figure 2). We may assume that 
these developments are due to the structural changes determined by the transition from a state-
owned  economy  to  market  economy.  Moreover,  CEE-10  governments  might  have  kept  a  lower 
taxation rate compared to EU-15, in order to stimulate investments and economic growth. Finally, 
the rate of growth of government revenue and expenditures for CEE-10 was higher than for EU-15, 
and the expenditures overrated the revenues
6.    
Figure 2   Budgetary deficit-to-GDP ratio for EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: annual average calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 available from AMECO 
 
Contrary to what data for the budgetary deficit for CEE-10 show, the situation for the indebtedness 
ratio looks differently (see Figure 3). The annual average of public debt-to-GDP ratio for EU-15 was 
higher than 60% of GDP. Except Hungary, the rest of CEE-10 had on average small ratios below 60%. 
                                                 
6 Based on annual data from Ameco,  ranged on 1996-2010, we calculated: (i) the annual average of taxation 
rate, including social security contributions (EU-15: 41% GDP; CEE-10: 33% GDP); (ii) the rate of growth of 
government revenues (EU-15: 3.2%; CEE-10: 9.6%); and (iii) the rate of growh of government expenditures (EU-
15: 3.5%; CEE-10: 9.9%). 75 
 
To some extent, the context may look peculiar, considering the correlation with the large fiscal 
deficits. This may be explained taking into account that most of the CEE-10 had very small public 
debt-to-GDP ratios in the early ‘90s due to some special arrangements with their creditors (e.g., 
Poland did not default its debt, but seized to repay it) or because they had already repaid the debt 
before 1990 (e.g., Romania repaid all the external debt in 1989). Hence, they did not have time for 
public debt accumulation. But, nevertheless, the increasing rate of public debt for CEE-10 was higher 
than for EU-15 (see Figure 4). Consequently, public debt accumulated in the last decade, and keeps 
rising due to the recent economic recession. 
Figure 3   Public debt-to-GDP ratio for EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: annual average calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 available from AMECO. For Bulgaria 
data ranges from 1997. For Slovenia data ranges from 2002. 
 
Figure 4  Increasing rate of public debt for EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: average annual increase rate calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 available from AMECO. 
For Bulgaria data ranges from 1998. For Slovenia data ranges from 2002. 
 
The high increasing rate of public debt in CEE-10 could be determined by the cheap money borrowed 
for financing fiscal deficits and public debt. Considering the real implicit interest rate on public debt 
as a proxy for the cost of government borrowings, we may notice that CEE-10 had lower costs than 
EU-15 (see Figure 5).   
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Figure 5   Real implicit interest rate on public debt EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: annual average calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 available from AMECO. The implicit 
interest rate was calculated as ratio of interest payments on public debt to public debt from previous year. The 
real implicit interest rate was calculated by subtracting the inflation rate.  For Bulgaria and Romania data 
ranges from 1998; for Latvia, Poland and Slovenia data ranges from 1997. 
Moreover, the gap between the real growth rate and the real implicit interest rate was positive for all 
CEE-10 (see Figure 6). The advanced European countries borrowed more expansive money compared 
to what their economies could have sustained. On the other hand, Central and Eastern European 
countries accessed cheap money for financing budgetary deficits or public debt. But cheap money 
and rising public debt could, somehow, be tricky and fool the governments! If they do not make all 
the  efforts  to  generate  primary  surpluses  in  the  long  run,  to  assure  the  financial  resources  for 
meeting the payment obligations without increasing public debt, the fiscal policy will be exposed to 
solvency risks, and hence could become unsustainable in the long run.  
Figure 6   The gap of financing for EU-15 vs. CEE-10 
 
Source: the gap calculated as difference between the real growth rate and the real implicit interest rate on 
public debt. Annual average calculated on annual data spanned on 1996-2010 available from AMECO. For 
Bulgaria and Romania data ranges from 1998; for Latvia, Poland and Slovenia data ranges from 1997. 
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Considering the previous discussion, one might state that the key macroeconomic variables show a 
good picture of CEE-10, but a closer look of them highlights some issues that could make fiscal policy 
vulnerable with respect to the intertemporal budget constraint.  
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussions 
Stoian (2011a) indicated fiscal vulnerabilities for 27 European Union countries using annual data 
ranged from 1970 to 2012 using an earlier version of the methodology. The model used to estimate 
the  required  primary  balance  assumes  that  government  does  not  aim  in  stabilizing  public  debt. 
Therefore, the primary balance is estimated using the growth rate of public debt which is different 
from zero. But, making this hypothesis we also may assume Ponzi games on undetermined time for 
financing  government  expenditures  which  violates,  to  some  extent,  the  transversality  condition 
implied  by  achieving  fiscal  sustainability.  This  condition  implies  that  on  long  run  public  debt 
converges to zero. Stoian (2011b) re-evaluated the methodology presented in her paper of 2011a 
and proposed a public debt dynamic model that stabilizes public debt. Then using an analogous 
approach as presented in this paper, the author showed the times when fiscal policy was vulnerable 
for ten advanced economies in the European Union.     
Refining the previous work, the current paper studies fiscal vulnerability only for Central and Eastern 
European countries employing the methodology described in Section 2 on annual data extracted for 
the 1996-2010 period. The variables implied are primary balance, public debt, implicit interest rate 
on public debt and GDP growth rate and inflation rate. Data is available from Ameco. The stabilizing 
primary balance is estimated using equation (7). Then, we apply Hodrick-Prescott filter for both the 
stabilizing  and  the  current  primary  balance  to  remove  the  cycle  component  and  to  obtain  the 
adjusted values there are to be compared. The deviations from the fiscal rule are calculated using 
equation  (12)  and  then  The  Cumulative  Excess  of the  Primary  Balance  using  equation  (13)  .The 
results are illustrated in the figure below:  
Figure 7   Cumulative Excess of the Primary Balance (CEPB) 
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The graphs show fiscal vulnerability for CEE-10 during the period under investigation. Generally, 
when CEPB has positive values and starts increasing indicates that fiscal policy turns into a vulnerable 
state. Large values for positive CEPB show that governments systematically failed in achieving the 
stabilizing primary balance for many consecutive years. When CEPB starts decreasing, it indicates 
that governments carried out adjustment measures in order to restore the primary balance to the 
stabilizer one showing that they aim at stabilizing public debt  
CEPB indicates fiscal vulnerability for the case of the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia since the 
beginning of the analyzed period. For the rest of the countries, fiscal policy turned into a vulnerable 
condition later: Bulgaria in 2008; Latvia in 2001; Hungary in 2000; Poland in 1998; Romania in 2002; 
and Slovenia in 2004.  
A closer look to the values for the adjusted stabilizing primary balance,   which sets up the fiscal 
rule, and for the adjusted current primary balance,   representing the current fiscal policy that 
government runs is illustrated by Figure 8:  
Figure 8   Fiscal policy vs. fiscal rule 
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Poland
Fiscal policy
Fiscal rule
-8.00
-6.00
-4.00
-2.00
0.00
2.00
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
Romania
Fiscal policy
Fiscal rule
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Slovenia
Fiscal policy
Fiscal rule
-3.50
-3.00
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
Slovakia
Fiscal policy
Fiscal rule
 
In the case of Bulgaria, CEPB is decreasing up to 2008, showing that current fiscal policy managed to 
meet  revenues  requirements  imposed  by  the  fiscal  rule.  In  2008,  the  negative  deviations  start 
accumulating. We can consider it as a first signal indicating that fiscal policy might move towards a 
‘vulnerable’ state. For the Czech Republic, CEPB shows fiscal vulnerability for the entire analyzed 
period which worsened to 2010.  The Czech Republic had low indebtedness ratio, but the increasing 
rate of public debt was one of the highest. Government might not have aimed at stabilizing public 
debt considering its low ratio but if it had to be prudent considering that the increasing rate and that 
the cost of public debt was closer to the economic growth rate, it would have tried to adjust the 
primary balance in order not to increase the exposure to fiscal solvency risk in the long run. Now, 
fiscal adjustment actions are required to restore the fiscal policy to the ‘good’ path and to avoid 
unsustainability in the long run. Estonia is the only country for which CEPB indicates a non-vulnerable 
fiscal policy. We can argue this situation considering its key fiscal variables: Estonia had the lowest 
public debt-to-GDP ratio among the CEE and also among the 27 European countries; also one of the 
lowest increasing rate and the economic growth rate was higher than the interest rate on public 
debt. Given this context, it would have been logically that government hadn’t aimed at stabilizing 79 
 
public debt. In addition, given the low values of the variables implied by the public debt dynamic 
equation it was easier for Estonian government to run primary surpluses. The cases of Latvia, Poland, 
Romania and Slovenia are somehow similar. CEPB indicates comparable patterns and the behavior of 
current fiscal policy with the respect to fiscal rule is also the same. It performed better than the fiscal 
rule for few years at the beginning of the analyzed period, and then, the current primary balance 
largely deviated from the stabilizing one. This suggests that government could not manage to fulfill 
the fiscal rule anymore due to changes that occurred: increasing public debt that required larger 
primary surplus than the government was able to realize. Lithuania and Slovakia are also similar to 
the case of the Czech Republic. Current fiscal policy under-performed the fiscal rule for the entire 
investigated period. The degree of vulnerability increased over the time and reached the maximum 
in 2010 suggesting that the fiscal policy largely diverged from the fiscal rule. The case of Hungary 
presents some interesting features. CEPB early warns on fiscal vulnerability in 2000. Between 1996 
and 2000, current fiscal policy overachieved repeatedly the stabilizing primary balance, but then 
under-performed.  Since  2006,  the  current  primary  deficit  has  begun  to  decrease  and  also  the 
deviations from the fiscal rule. CEPB still indicates a vulnerable fiscal policy. The adjustment efforts 
should be consistent, to place fiscal policy into the ‘good’ path.     
Concerning the recent financial turmoil that hit worldwide, we may state that Bulgaria and Estonia 
are less exposed to that shock, considering that CEPB gives some signals in 2008, and respectively, in 
2009 but it still have negative values. Zaidi and Rejniak (2010) argued that in Bulgaria’s case the 
situation  with  the  crisis  is  not  dire  because  of  considerable  public  sector  buffers,  high  foreign 
exchange reserves, and also fiscal surplus. Estonia’s case looks somehow similar. The policies during 
the boom years that maintained the bursting economy relatively under control, allowed Estonia to 
run fiscal surplus that led to accumulation of sizeable fiscal reserves, and practically the country had 
virtually no public debt going into the crisis, fact also mentioned by Zaidi and Rejniak in their paper of 
2010.  The  rest  of  the  investigated  countries  are  much  exposed  to  the  solvency  risk  and, 
consequently, the ability of the fiscal policy to absorb the possible shocks on increasing public debt 
has weakened. The CEPB shows large accumulation of the deviations from the fiscal rule that make 
governments’  task  in  these  countries  more  difficult.  Fiscal  adjustments  would  have  to  be  more 
severe and consistent so that the fiscal policy is restored to the ‘soundness’ of the fiscal rule.  
The  Cumulative  Excess  of  the  Primary  Balance  may  be  a  better  indicator  for  studying  fiscal 
vulnerability than the primary balance or public debt. Government can run primary surplus but the 
size of it says nothing about the solvency if we not compare it with a relevant benchmark. High public 
debt-to-GDP  ratio  can  also  point  out  some  difficulties  for  fiscal  policy  particularly  when  it  is 
associated  with  an  increasing  tendency.  We  may  presume  that  fiscal  policy  could  have  some 
exposure to solvency risk but we cannot indicate the degree of vulnerability. Moreover, compared to 
the advanced economies in European Union, Central and Eastern European countries have lower 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, but the increasing rate is higher. The Czech Republic, for instance had an 
indebtedness ratio of 12% of GDP in 1996. The ratio increased during the reviewed period and it 
reached to a maximum of 40% of GDP in 2010.  Primary balance ran on deficit but varied. Analyzing 
these indicators is much difficult to state whether fiscal policy was vulnerable. CEPB for the Czech 
Republic is positive and increasing over the period indicating the increasing exposure of fiscal policy 
to solvency risk. Bulgaria had large public debt-to-GDP ratios in the late ‘90s and when it started 
decreasing.  The  government  ran  primary  surpluses  below  1%  of  GDP.  CEPB  indicates  a  non-80 
 
vulnerable fiscal policy until 2008 when the first signal warned on a possible change of the fiscal 
policy condition. 
            
5. Concluding remarks 
This study aimed at examining whether fiscal policy for the case of ten Central and Eastern European 
countries  is vulnerable  in  the  sense  indicating  by Stoian  (2011).  CEE  performed  better  than the 
advanced European economies considering that during 1996 and 2010 they had lower public debt-to-
GDP ratios and the economic growth rate was higher than the interest rate on public debt. But the 
increasing  rate  of  public  debt  was  larger  than  for  EU15.  Therefore,  we  investigated  if  CEE 
governments have the ability to fulfill intertemporal budgetary constraint and to keep out fiscal 
policy from the solvency risks.   We used a newly introduced methodology which indicates when 
current fiscal policy departs from a particular fiscal rule. Using annual date for 1996-2010 period, the 
results show fiscal vulnerability for Central and Eastern European. Depending on the size of CEPB, the 
degree of vulnerability differs from country to country. Negative values of CEPB suggest ‘good’ and 
non-vulnerable  fiscal  policy  while  positive  values  point  towards  fiscal  vulnerability.  The  results 
indicate that Bulgaria and Estonia are the only countries for which we found no evidence for fiscal 
vulnerability  even  when  financial  turmoil  hit  worldwide.  For  the  rest  of  the  countries  under 
investigation, we observed more or less fiscal vulnerability depending on the size of CEPB. In these 
cases, unfortunately, governments has to face the challenges derived from the recent crisis using a 
vulnerable fiscal policy which makes more difficult the way of recovery.    
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